The paper is devoted to developing methods for control of ecological-economic systems consisting of three hierarchically subordinate subjects of control. In describing the dynamics of a system state, equations in partial derivatives that are solved numerically according to a semi-implicit scheme of the finite-di erence method are used. To achieve its main goal, the subject of control of the upper level applies di erent control methods. M ethods of hierarchical control that di er in the direction of action are proposed. At last a comparative analysis of the obtained results is made.
Introduction
Today, some economic regions are on the verge of an ecological catastrophe. As finance of environmental protection is decreasing, problems of environ mental safety are getting more and more acute. This specifies the necessity for forecasting changes of the state of an ecological syst em, assessments of consequences of made decisions for the environment. Therefore, the development of control mechanisms for comp lex ecological-economic systems is one of the burning tasks .In the last decades, in analy zing ecological-economic systems is us ed the notion of hierarch ically controlled dynamic systems [1] in whose concept a specific character of control mechanis ms for real ecologicaleconomic objects is taken into consideration. The simp lest hierarchically controlled dynamic system is a two-level system studied in [2] [3] [4] [5] .
This paper analyzing ecological-economic systems are used three-level systems that more exact ly describe the structure of modern control systems for ecological-economic systems; methods of hierarchical control that allow achieving a stable development of an eco logical subsystem are proposed . The main goal of the study is to define optimal standards of distribution of environmental contamination penalty for the center government among budgets of di erent levels. The solution to this problem may help justify existing standards or develop new ones.
Mathematical formulation of the problem
Let along the river there be N industrial enterprises (IE) that discharge contaminants (C) into the river. Discharged C are for convenience divided into carbon and nit rogen -bearing. IE pay penalties for discharge of contaminants into the waterway. Hierarch ical three-level systems of river water quality control that involve sources of action of the upper (center government -CG), intermediate (local government-LG), and lower (enterprise-IE) levels and controlled dynamic system (CDS or waterway). It is assumed that relat ions between the elements of the system under study are organized as follows: CG acts on LG, LG acts on IE, IE acts on CDS. In the system, the presence of feedback is assumed : informat ion about the current state of CDS co mes to all subjects of control. CG must maintain CDS in stable state but cannot act on it directly. The indirect act ion of CG on CDS is in defining what part of money obtained from IE in the form of pay ment for discharge of contaminants into the waterway comes to LG. The task of CG is to create conditions under which it would be profitable for LG and IE, maximizing money that they receive, to stick to the fixed standards of quality of river and waste water. beside maintaining CDS in stable state, it tends to define optimal standards of penalty distribution among budgets of di erent levels, i.e., maximize the objective function of the form
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Here t is a t ime coordinate; P t is a share of carbon and nitrogen-bearing ( m c and m n respectively) C removed on the i th IE in the process of waste water purification; C is an expenditure function of CG on the improvement of river water quality dependent on the total amount of C discharged into the river; is an instant up to which the examination is being made;
H t is a share of payment of TP for discharge of contaminants into the waterway that rest with CG in the budget at the instant t . LC tend to maximize money , their objective function has the form
where 0
C is an LC expenditure function on the improvement of river water quality;
q m n c are minimal ad missible purification rates of waste water per IE that are among the constraints on IE controls. In the functions 0 C and C are reflected material losses of the society and regions due to contaminated water. The goal of IE is to maximize its profit, i.e.,
